In early 1999, the subcontinent stood at a precipice. Both India and Pakistan had declared nuclear capabilities the previous year. The region’s future depended on whether statesmanship could override military adventurism. Then Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif attempted to seize the moment with the Lahore Declaration, a framework aimed at resolving disputes, including Kashmir, through dialogue and restraint.
But as Mr Vajpayee’s bus rolled into Lahore and hands were being shaken at grand state banquets, Pakistani troops, under the command of General Pervez Musharraf, were already occupying strategic heights across the Line of Control in Kargil. These positions had been vacated by Indian troops for the winter.
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Mr Musharraf, whom Mr Sharif had appointed as Army Chief in October 1998, had neither consulted nor informed the civilian leadership of his operation. What followed was a full-fledged war in the heights of Kargil, and India’s eventual military control in July 1999. By October 1999, Mr Musharraf had staged a coup. Mr Sharif was arrested, his government dismissed, and Pakistan was once again under direct military rule.
Fast-forward to 2025. Pakistan remains a hybrid democracy at best. While civilian governments are elected in Islamabad, the locus of real power lies elsewhere in Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistan Army.
With India unleashing its military might deep inside Pakistani territory, targeting terror camps, Pakistan’s General Asim Munir, who became Army Chief in November 2022, finds himself under pressure to match his words with action after tall talks of defending his country by any means necessary.
Offer To Shehbaz, Rize Of Munir
One less-discussed facet of the 1999 coup was Mr Musharraf’s back-channel offer to Shehbaz Sharif — replace Nawaz as prime minister and receive the military’s backing. Shehbaz declined and alerted his elder brother. This choice may have preserved the Sharif family’s unity, but it did little to stop the military’s overreach.
Shehbaz, now in the role once held by his elder brother, finds himself standing next to General Munir, the ideological successor of Mr Musharraf.
Where Mr Musharraf styled himself as a liberal moderniser, General Munir embraces a more overt religious nationalism. General Munir has often invoked Islamic imagery and terminology in his speeches. General Munir recently said Kashmir is Islamabad’s “jugular vein” and that Pakistan “won’t forget it”.
“Our stance is absolutely clear, it was our jugular vein, it will be our jugular vein, we will not forget it. We will not leave our Kashmiri brothers in their heroic struggle,” he had said.
The Shadow of 1999 in 2025
As in 1999, Kashmir remains central to the India-Pakistan dynamic. Following the deadly Pahalgam terror attack, where 26 people were killed, India launched airstrikes on Pakistan, which it accuses of sponsoring and safeguarding terrorist groups. Operation Sindoor was not only the most expansive cross-border strike conducted by India since the Balakot operation.
According to government sources, Indian intelligence combined satellite imagery, human sources, and intercepted communications to establish the use of specific compounds by groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Pakistan responded by carrying out cross-border shelling. A day later, India targeted and neutralised Pakistani Air Defence Radars and systems in several locations, including Lahore.
Right now, the pressure is on General Munir, with all his bluster, about what he will do next.
While General Munir has not confronted Shehbaz’s position as the leader of his nation, history repeats itself by putting a Sharif and a fiery military general once again facing questions over their future with Kashmir as the backdrop.