As the civil war in Sudan approaches its second anniversary on April 15, the hapless country seems hurtling towards a complex and divisive denouement. The next phase of developments in Sudan, Africa’s third largest country by area bordering seven countries and the strategic Red Sea, would have far-reaching consequences for the politically fragile Horn of Africa.
The situation is already dire. In a testimony to the UN Security Council last week, the UNICEF chief disclosed that the ongoing conflict has evolved into the world’s most severe humanitarian emergency, affecting 30 million individuals, two-thirds of Sudan’s population. More than 14 million—over a quarter of Sudanese—have been displaced, including nearly 3.5 million forced to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries. The number of casualties is put at a minimum of 20,000. However, given the wide extent of undocumented, no-holds-barred brutality unleashed by the conflict, the actual figure may well be many times higher. In economic terms, the losses are put at $15 billion and the national GDP is expected to decline by 48% in 2025.
Where It All Started
Large and multi-ethnic Sudan is no stranger to civil strife and misgovernance. Since independence in 1956, the country has had 15 military coups and two civil wars that killed 1.5 million people and resulted in the eventual secession of South Sudan in 2011. For the past two decades, a conflict in the western region of Darfur has been waged by the infamous Janjaweed militia against local non-Arab Muslims, cumulatively killing over 2 lakh people and displacing two million.
The genesis of the current crisis lies in the 30 years of autocracy by dictator Omar Hassan al-Bashir. He was overthrown in a military coup in April 2019 after months of popular protests. The Transitional Military Council signed framework agreements with citizens’ groups to create a joint military-civilian sovereignty council and draft a new constitution. However, this civilian-military cohabitation collapsed after wobbling for two years. A military coup followed in October 2021 that installed Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chief of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), as the head of state. Although street protests demanding complete civilian rule and international pressures revived a power-sharing framework, it fared no better. Simultaneously, the hitherto autonomous Rapid Support Force (RSF), a para-military militia led by Gen Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, rejected the December 2022 draft framework and proposed its integration into the SAF, thus pushing the multi-pronged chaos over the edge. On April 15, 2023, an armed conflict ensued between an estimated 3,00,000-strong SAF and the RSF, which had nearly 1,00,000 well-armed fighters. Beneath the ideological and ethnic trappings are the unadulterated ambitions of the two warlords. The ongoing mayhem has completely drowned the raison d’etre of the crisis: the demand for civilian rule.
No Ceasefires Have Held
The bitter and bloody civil war in Sudan has defied several peace-making attempts in Jeddah, Doha, Geneva and elsewhere. Even the short-term ceasefires have not held. For the initial few months, the hostilities remained inconclusive and the foreign involvement was low. However, in the past few months, the SAF seems to have got the upper hand. It has recently notched several successes against the RSF in the centre and adjoining southern areas. It has retaken most of the national capital Khartoum-Omdurman and has wrested Wadi al-Madani, the capital of al-Gazeera province, a strategically important cross-road and the country’s bread-basket. However, the RSF still controls the vast region of Darfur in the west, where the SAF’s solitary perch at el-Fasher is under its siege. It also has a hold on West Kordofan province bordering South Sudan, which was ceded as a separate country in 2011 after decades of civil war. Several other areas of Sudan are either under contestation or are under the control of independent tribal militias with shifting loyalties.
Pretending To Speak For Sudan
The military situation on the ground and geopolitical alignments predicate a de facto partition of the country. This shift seems to have prompted both sides to unveil their respective plans to lure uncommitted stakeholders—both domestic and foreign-based. In late February, the RSF and its allies signed a ‘founding charter’ of a breakaway government of a ‘New Sudan’, designed to pull legitimacy from the existing army-led government and facilitate advanced arms imports. The ‘new constitution’ formally establishes a government and maps out what it describes as a federal, secular state, split into eight regions. Although the RSF and its allies have said the government will be formed in the coming weeks, it is still unclear who will be in it or where it will operate from. The SAF-led junta has countered these moves by announcing on February 25 that its plan envisages forming a transitional government under a civilian prime minister and initiating a national dialogue with political and civil society groups, eventually leading to free and fair elections. On March 13, the Sudanese Foreign Minister claimed that consultations have begun to launch an inclusive political process aimed at forming a technocratic government to lead the country through the transitional period, with a focus on reconstruction. Needless to add, both these warring factions pretend to speak for Sudan.
Why A Partition Could Be Dangerous
The international community has reacted warily to these announcements. In a statement on March 5, the UN Security Council expressed “grave concerns” over the “founding charter”, adding it could worsen an “already dire humanitarian situation”. On March 12, the African Union reiterated its warning that the move to form a parallel government by the RSF posed “a huge risk of the partitioning of the country”. It urged all of its member states, as well as the international community, “not to recognise any government or parallel entity aimed at partitioning … the Republic of Sudan or its institutions”. The EU also reiterated its commitment to the “unity and territorial integrity of Sudan”. These foreign stakeholders seemed to be persuaded against the RSF move in light of the disastrous partition of neighbouring Libya. The stakeholders also worry that a fledgling state comprising Darfur and Kordofan would exacerbate the regional fragility. It would be at war with the SAF in Khartoum. Moreover, it would border brittle states such as Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, all of which are facing fissiparous tendencies. Last but not least, over the past two decades, the RSF, stemming mainly from the Arab Janjaweed militia, has engaged in pogroms against the African tribes of Darfur. These activities have intensified during two years of civil war, sending millions of refugees to neighbouring countries. Creating a separate country led by RSF would coagulate this problem. Sooner than later, these temporary refugee settlements would become the breeding grounds for undesirable activities, including a base for anti-RSF militias.
Hoping Against Hope
Although mainstream stakeholders have been against the repartitioning of Sudan, the wider international context is more nuanced. The Sudanese civil war does not rank high on the priority list of the international community, which has more politically pressing crises to worry about. There seems to be a clear division among the various regional countries. The SAF-led government is widely recognised and it is militarily supported by Egypt, Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, the UAE is believed to be militarily backing the RSF, even as Abu Dhabi stoutly denies it. Its motives are unclear and could range from profiteering from smuggled gold from Darfur mines to curbing Sudan’s “political Islamic” tendencies backing the SAF. Chad and Gen Khalifa Haftar’s Benghazi-based government in Libya are also supporting the RSF, which reportedly continues to receive the support of Russia’s Wagner militia, disbanded two years ago. Further, there is no dearth of arms and mercenaries from the global grey market as well as the motley non-state actors in the Middle East and Africa. The resumed civil wars in South Sudan and Ethiopia and instability in eastern Congo are also likely to cast their long shadows on Sudan.
At the same time, some observers see an east-west partition of Sudan as a natural progression in the unwinnable civil war. They expect that such a division would bring an end to the spread-out civil war that has devastated the entire country. Post-partition, they expect the two sides would get preoccupied with the consolidation of their respective fiefs, the physical and institutional reconstruction, and muzzle demands for a due political process towards democratisation. However, given the bitter legacy of the two years of civil war, such sanguinity would be a ‘hoping-against-hope’ wager against realism.
(Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador and an Arabist. He currently heads Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based consultancy.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author